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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 748 
Accident time: 10:35 Accident Date: 10/05/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/1023/08097, 
MF0086, Bayan Khail 
Village, Jaji District, 
Paktya Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 16/06/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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File date: 16th June 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-02 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC S-East to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner [Demining group] DT-02. The accident occurred at 10:35 
hours on 10 May 2009 at minefield number AF/1023/08097/MF0086, located in Bayan Khail 
village, Jaji district of Paktya province. 
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/1023/08097/MF 0086 is located in Bayan Khail village Jaji district of Paktya 
province. From the military point of view the Jaji district was one of the strategic places during 
the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, as it is located on the border with Pakistan and had been 
using as a major access way by Mujahedeen therefore, Russian troops heavily laid mines in 
different parts of this district. The majority of minefields in Jaji district are on the hillsides as it 
is a mountainous district.  
On 10 May 2009 at 10:35 [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-02 was excavating 
on a detected signal in his clearance lane where he hit the top of an anti-personnel mine by 
bayonet and it caused the mine going off. The procedure of investigating a pinpointed signal 
was ignored by this deminer and he was working carelessly. As a result this accident the 
deminer got several injuries to different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs. The deminer 
had only used the jacket of his PPE without skirt. If he would wear the skirt too, his lower 
limbs would have been protected. Investigation shows that the helmet and visor has been 
used properly.  
As the majority of minefields in Jaji district are located on the hillsides, so the likelihood of 
mines with changed position exists due to raining hence a comprehensive site operations 
plan was required to consider all the predictable scenarios during the clearance operations 
e.g. mines direction changes, mine displacement etc. But this point was missed in the site 
operations plan. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The carelessness of deminer, poor command and control and poor management of the team 
caused the accident to happen.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
• As outlined in investigation report, [Demining group] operations department is 
recommended to conduct special revision training for this team and the training 
package should be shared with the MACCA OPS department prior to start the 
training.  
• The investigation team also recommended for provision of mechanical support to 
demining teams in Jaji that which needs to be considered. 
• Internal QA is to be strengthened and focus on main contributing factors to an 
accident.  
• The management of [Demining group] is requested to respond to MACCA with a 
management solution that, identify why this accident happened and how they can 
prevent the recurrence of such accident in the future. We expect to receive [Demining 
group]’s official response by no later than 24th June 2009. 
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 Victim Report 
Victim number: 939 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Hands; severe Legs 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "the deminer got several injuries to 
different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the task planning was inadequate and that the Victim was not wearing 
appropriate PPE and not working with appropriate caution, but these errors were not 
corrected. The failure to plan the Task properly was also a significant Management Control 
Inadequacy. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators 
recommended that refresher training was necessary. 
The PPE “skirt” mentioned in the report is not explained but is presumed to be an extension to 
the frontal blast protection commonly used. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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